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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 




BULLION MONARCH URANIUM Case No. 8859 




BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
All Italics are ours. Parties will be referred to as in 
the Court below, appellant will be referred to as plain-
tiff, and Bullion Monarch Uranium Company, Inc., a 
Utah Corporation, as defendant. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal arises out of the granting by the Trial 
Court of defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Plaintiff is the owner of an unpatented mining claim 
upon which proper notice of location was filed and the 
actual location established in 1955. The name of plain-
tiff's claim is "Poison Fraction". Defendant is the owner 
of a mining claim known as the "Farmer John No. 3." 
The dispute between the parties is as to the proper line 
of demarkation between Poison Fraction and Farmer 
John No. 3. 
The Farmer John No. 3 claim was located in 1943 
by James Sargent and members of his family. <R. 23). 
It is conceded for the purpose of the motion for sum-
mary judgment that the original location of the Farmer 
John No. 3 is as claimed by plaintiff. That location was 
along a fluorspar vein which had a strike of North 50 
degrees East in the vicinity of where the claim was lo-
cated. Defendant's Exhibit "A" outlines the general dis-
pute between the parties. It shows the original Farmer 
John #3 lying parallel to the fluorspar vein. It shows in 
a broken red line the present claimed boundary line of 
the Farmer John #3. It shows in a red color the area 
in dispute between the Farmer John #3 Claim as now 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
claimed and the Poison Fraction which the plaintiff 
filed. 
Neither defendant, nor any of its predecessors have 
ever filed an amended Notice of Location on the Farmer 
John No. 3. No attempt has been made to change the 
original Notice of Location. The original Notice of Lo-
cation described the Farmer John No. 3 side lines as 
paralleling the fluorspar vein. The discovery monument 
is described as being on the fluorspar vein. 
Between 1943 and 1952 the side lines of the Farmer 
John No. 3 claim were shifted to the present claimed lo-
cation of said lines. 
One of the original locators of the Farmer John group 
of claims pointed out to plaintiff the location of the 
various monuments that were used in the original stak-
ing and location of the Farmer John No. 3. (Deposition 
of plaintiff, page 23). One of the sons of the original 
locator who participated in the actual location indicated 
to plaintiff that the line of the original location ran along 
parallel with the fluorspar vein. (Defendant's Deposition, 
page 29.) 
While plaintiff was still doing contract work for de-
fendant on portions of the property covered by Farmer 
John No.3 claim. A lawsuit was filed by the originallo-
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4 
cator in which he claimed that the defendant had moved 
the lines on the claim. <Deposition, page 37). At the 
time the original locator, Sargent, claimed that the cor-
ner location was a different point than is now claimed 
by defendant. (Deposition pages 41 and 42). Plaintiff 
became aware of the fact that defendant was moving its 
claim around and cautioned officers of the corporation 
to cease doing that while he was still on the property. 
(Deposition page 41). The present location of the boun-
daries are not where Sargent pointed them out to plaintiff 
in 195'2. When they were actually placed in their present 
location is not clearly established, but it has been since 
19S2. Between 19S2 and 19SS the monuments on thE 
corners of the Farmer John No. 3, as claimed by defen-
dant, have remained in position. 
Plain tiff descovered that the original notice of lo-
cation described the lines of the Farmer John No. 3 as 
being parallel to the fluorspar vein and as having a strike 
of North sao east. He also knew that the present claimed 
line of the Farmer John No. 3 did not run parallel to the 
fluorspar vein and did not have a strike of North sao east. 
With this fact in mind, plaintiff filed the Poison Fraction 
in the area that would not be covered by the Farmer John 
No 3 claim if its location is placed in accordance with 
Notice of Location and is placed on the area where the 
original locators informed plaintiff they had located it. 
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The basic questions plaintiff believes which are 
created by the action of defendant and by the filing of 
this claim are as follows: 
(a) What effect does the moving of monuments 
marking the boundary lines and discovery on a claim 
have on the validit1y of the original location of the claim? 
(b) Can adverse possession change the boundary 
lines where the claimed area has not been in possession 
of the locator for the statutory period. 
(c) Where it is conceded that the marked lines on 
an unpatented mining claims have been moved from one 
place to another, what is the correct line to mark the 
limits of the claim? 
SUMMARY OF POINTS 
I 
THE LOCATION OF THE CORRECT AND VALID SOUTH LINE 
OF THE FARMER JOHN NO. 3 IS A DISPUTED QUESTION OF 
FACT. 
II 
NO SUFFICIENT SHOWING, UNDISPUTED BY PLAINTIFF, 
HAS BEEN MADE TO ESTABLISH THE SOUTH BOUNDARY LINE 
OF THE CLAIM BY. ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
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THE CORRECT AND VALID SOUTH LINE OF THE FARMER 
JOHN NO. 3 CLAIM IS A DISPUTED QUESTION OF FACT. 
There are three statutory provisions which govern 
the location of mining claims on the public domain. They 
are Section 22, Title 30, U. S. C. A. which reads as fol-
lows: 
"Except as otherwise provided, all valuable 
mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United 
States, both surveyed and unsurveyed, shall be 
free and open to exploration and purchase, and the 
lands in which they are found to occupation and 
purchase, by citizens of the United States and 
those who have declared their intention to become 
such, under regulations prescribed by law, and 
according to the local customs or rules of miners 
in the several mining districts, so far as the same 
are applicable and not inconsistent with the laws 
of the United States. R.S. Section 2319; Feb. 25, 
1920, c. 85, Section 1, 41 Stat. 437." 
The Utah statutory regulations read as follows: 
"40-1-3. Boundaries to be marked. - Mining 
claims and millsites must be distinctly marked 
on the ground so that the boundaries thereof can 
be readily traced. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
"40-1-4. Copy of location notice to be recorded. 
Within thirty days after the date of posting the 
location notice upon the claim the locator or lo-
cators, or his or their assigns, must file for record 
in the office of the county recorder of the county 
in which such claim is situated a substantial copy 
of such notice of location. Such notice of location 
shall not be abstracted unless a subsequent con-
veyance affecting the same property is filed for 
record, whereupon it shall be abstracted." 
It is conceded by plaintiff that the original staking 
and filing of the Farmer John No. 3 claim marked the 
boundaries of the claim and the filing adequately com-
plied with the sections of the Utah Code quoted governing 
the filing of mining claims. Plaintiff would further stip-
ulate that the Farmer John No. 3 claim, as described in 
the filing by James Sargent in 1943, may be surveyed 
and established upon the ground itself, and as such, would 
constitute the Farmer John No. 3 claim. 
It has been agreed by defendant that the lines des-
cribed in the filing by Sargent in 1943 are not those which 
are now claimed by it as being the lines which marked 
the boundaries of the Farmer John No. 3. 
It may be that the moving of boundary markers or 
discovery monuments would indicate an intention on the 
part of the locator to abandon the claim which he had 
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located. Defendant must claim that the movement of the 
lines was for the purpose of increasing the area to be in-
cluded in the Farmer John No. 3. Is such movement 
effective for that purpose? 
The maintenance of discovery monuments, corner 
posts and other boundary markers is a subject of para-
mount importance in the establishment of a valid mining 
claim. 
The Federal Statute requires that the claim must 
be distinctly marked on the ground so that its boundaries 
can be readily traced. The Utah Statute, U. C. A. 1953, 
40-1-3, requires that the claims be distinctly marked on 
the ground so that the boundaries thereof can be readily 
traced. 
The movement of the corner post and the discovery 
monument is in effect the marking of a new location for 
a mining claim. In the marking of a new location for a 
mining claim U t~ah Law requires posting, and filing of 
notice of location. 
The matter of the locator changing his boundary 
lines after the filing of his claim has been the subject of 
a United States Supreme Court decision. In Shoshone 
Mining Company v. Rutter, 87 Fed. 801, 20 Sup. Ct. 
726, 177 U.S. 505, it was held that where a locator chang-
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es the boundary of his mining claim to include new 
ground, it is a new location and the laws of the State must 
be complied with which requires a new posting, mark-
ing and recording. For like effect, see also Dines v. Snod-
grass, 9 Colo. 339, 12 P. 206. 
Concerning the general law governing the main-
tenance of boundaries on mining claims, the best authority 
states as follows: See Wilson I. Snyder, Mines and Mining, 
Vol. 1, page 363, Section 394: 
"There are some decisions which seem to sanc-
tion the moving of boundary stakes during the 
statutory period within which the final discovery 
work, marking of boundaries and recording of the 
claim is to be done, even though the intervening 
rights of others would be injuriously affected there-
by. But the soundness of this rule may well be 
doubted. As said by the Supreme Court of the 
United States: 'The location must be distinctly 
marked on the ground, with all the care possible; 
the end lines marked on surface will often vary 
from a right angle to the true course of the vein. 
But whatever inconvenience or hardship may thus 
happen, it is better that the boundary claim should 
be definitely determined by the line of the surface 
location than that they should be subject to per-
petual readjustment according to the subterranean 
developments made by the mine owner. 
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The rule, whatever hardship it may work in 
particular cases, should be settled, and thus pre-
vent, as far as practicable such uncertainty. If the 
first locator will not or cannot ascertain the true 
course of the vein, and draws his lines ignorantly, 
he must bear the consequences.' " 
Plaintiff has been unable to discover any statutory 
or case law which would justify any locator in moving 
either his discovery monument or the corner posts mark-
ing the boundary of his location. 
In the case at bar it would appear that plaintiff was 
stimulated into filing the Poison Fraction by his discovery 
that the recorded Notice of Location on the Farmer John 
No. 3 fixed the lines of said claim as running North 50° 
East and paralleling the fluorspar vein for he knew that 
the lines on the ground which defendant claimed marked 
the boundary of Farmer John No. 3 ran due east and 
west and crossed rather than paralleled the strike of the 
fluorspar vein. See Exhibit "A" for a clear illustration of 
the discrepancies between the Notice of Location and the 
Claimed locations by defendant. 
Defendant, or its predecessors in interest, was at-
tempting to swing the Farmer John No. 3 from its true 
North 50° East bearing to a direct east-west bearing. 
No notice of location on the new lines of the 
Farmer John No. 3 was ever filed. It appears clear that 
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under the laws of the State of Utah as set forth by this 
Court in Cranford v. Gibbs, 123 U. 447, 260 P. 2d 
870, a locator may rely on the recorded Notice of Lo-
cation, and that under the Utah Statute the Notice of 
Location must contain sufficient detail and accuracy so 
that the location described in the Notice may be examined 
upon reasonable effort. The Utah Court in setting forth 
said principle was reiterating a long established and fre-
quently stated rule as set forth in Morrison, on Mining 
Rights, 16th Ed. p. 88. 
The general principle is that the Notice as recorded 
must correspond to the actual location and the location 
on the ground may not be changed after the notice has 
been recorded. The following cases so hold: Meydenbauer 
v. Stevens, 78 F. 787; Hausmith v. Butcher, 4 Mont. 299, 
1 P. 714; Ne:wbid vs. Thurston, 65 Cal. 419, 4 P. 409. 
See also Doe v. Waterloo Mining Co., 70 F. 455, 17 CCA 
190; Erharde vs. Boara, 113 U. S. 527; Sanders v. Nobel, 
22 Mont. 110, 55 P. 1037. 
Defendant having conceded that the lines of the 
Farmer John No.3 have been changed, yet no amendment 
incorporating said change has ever been filed, it would 
then appear that the area in red on Exhibit "A" falls out-
side of the Farmer John No. 3. The only notice of loca-
tions now covering said area is the notice of location filed 
by plantiff. 
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It is difficult to understand why defendant, or its 
predecessors in interest, have not filed amended notices 
of loction incorporating the movement of the line of the 
Farmer John No. 3. Perhaps the explanation lies in the 
fact that they believed an amendment would amount to 
a new and different location and were therefore afraid 
that they could not maintain the priority of location as of 
1943. If the amendment actually amounted to the loca-
tion of a new claim then it would be effective only as of 
the time that the amendment was filed. This Court, in 
Cranford v. Gibbs supra, stated clearly the law which 
covers amendments and the requirement of the notice of 
location. 
In Cranford v. Gibbs, supra the Court held as fol-
lows: 
"(2,3) Priority of location cannot be maintained 
by amendment if in fact the amendment amounts 
to a new and different location. However, neither 
niceties of description in original notices of lo-
cation nor more than reasonable accuracy in the 
staking of claims is required to effectuate a valid 
location. 
"(4) Prospectors are not engineers nor does the 
law expect them to be. However, the law does re-
quire sufficient detail and accuracy irt the notice 
as recorded to allow location of the claim upon 
reasonable effort." 
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Because of the limitations on the sizes of claims the 
Farmer John No. 3 claim could not be enlarged beyond 
ISO feet on each side of the fluorspar vein. The fluorspar 
vein is a natural monument the position of which can-
not be varied and the strike of which indicates the way 
that the side lines of the claim must run. As a conse-
quence, there can be no doubt as to ,vhere Farmer John 
#3 originally was located. 
It is respectfully submitted that defendant cannot 
establish a valid mining claim to the disputed portion be-
tween the Farmer John #3 and the Poison Fraction by 
simply moving the discovery monument or moving the 
comer posts from their original position to the new posi-
tion and then occupying under the new position of the 
markers. 
It is further respectfully submitted that under the 
conceded facts if defendant must rely upon compliance 
with the Stautes of the United States and the State of 
Utah governing the location of the mining claim it must 
fail because it is conceded that the Statutes have not been 
complied with, and that the plaintiff's location is the only 
one complying with the Statutes. 
POINT II 
NO SUFFICIENT SHOWING, UNDISPUTED BY PLAINTIFF, 
HAS BEEN MADE TO ESTABLISH THE CLAIM BY ADVERSE POS-
SESSION. 
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Section 38, of Title 30, U. S. Code, provides for the 
establishment of title by adverse possession. The section, 
however, requires that the claim be occupied for the time 
prescribed by the Statute of Limitations for the n:ining 
claims of this State. 
Section 78-12-5, U. C. A. 1953 provides that a seven-
year period of possession is necessary to establish an ad-
verse right to real property. 
Plaint1iff worked on the property of defendant as a 
contract miner during the years 1948 to 1952. (Deposition 
Page 37). In 1952 a legal action involving defendant was 
commenced, the action concerned the boundary of 
the Farmer John No. 3. The basic dispute seemed to be 
that the original locator, Sargent, claimed that the de-
fendant had moved the line of the claim as originally es-
stablished. (Deposition Page 37). In 1952, plaintiff com-
plained about the fact that the defendant was moving 
the line on the Farmer John No. 3 claims. (Deposition 
Page 41). At that time the line on the corner on the 
Northeast side of the Farmer John No. 3 claim was not 
where the present claimed line of defendent is located. 
(Deposition Page 42). 
Even if defendant were able under Utah law to es-
tablish a right by adverse possession to the disputed area, 
still under the evidence before the Trial Court, it would 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
appear that there is a serious dispute as to what lines 
had been used as marking the south boundary of the 
Farmer John #3 during the past seven years . 
.a.f 
The conveyance by Sargent to defendant covered 
only the Farmer John No. 3 claim, and the Notice of Lo-
cation on said claim would fix the boundaries of the claim. 
If defendant is restricted in its ownership to the Farmer 
John No. 3 as described in the Notice of Location, then 
the area in red is not part of that claim. 
Defendant is claiming that the area outside of the 
Farmer John No. 3 line as described by the Notice of Lo-
cation, has been occupied for seven years. That it has a 
right to this property by reason of the provision of Sec-
tion 78-12-10 U.C.A. 1953. This section applies to an 
adverser where his claim is not founded on a written in-
strument or judgment~. It reads as follows: 
"Where it appears that there has been an actual 
continued occupation of land under claim of title, 
exclusive of any other right, but not founded 
upon a written instrument, judgment or decree, 
the lands so occupied and no others is deemed to 
have been held adversely." 
Defendant, in its own right, has only been on the 
property since 1949. Up until1952 the lines of the Farm-
er John #3 were uncertain even as between the original 
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locator and defendant. 
It is submitted that there is a question of fact as to 
what area has been actually occupied for the requisite 
seven-year period, Section 78-12-10, U. C. A. 1953. 
Plaintiff's Notice of Location and the establishment 
of his claim was on June 6, 1955. Seven years had not 
elapsed between the time defendant first came on the 
property and the time plaintiff filed the Notice of Loca-
tion for the Poison Fraction. 
There is no evidence concerning the exact areas 
which were mined, there is a dispute as to the actual 
property claimed under the original filing. These dis-
putes, it is respectfully submitted, create questions of fact 
which could not be resolved against the plaintiff. 
Section 78-12-7 Utah Code Annotated 1953 pro-
vides that where legal title to land exists it will be pre-
sumed that the possession remains in the owner. The 
legal title to the area in dispute, as well as the Farmer 
John No. 3 claim is still in the United States of America 
since all of the claims involved are unpatented mining 
claims. Section 78-12-7 U.C.A. 1953 would then make it 
necessary for proof to show just exactly who was in pos-
session of the disputed area. The exact area occupied 
would become an issue of fact which would require the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
presentation of evidence and could not be resolved on 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Throughout the trial court hearing defendant main-
tained that while it was in possession of the disputed area 
plaintJff could not enter upon said area and perfect a 
mining claim adverse to and contrary to the rights of 
defendant. Apparently, defendan't position was that 
while a claimant is perfecting title by adverse possession 
no third person may peaceably enter upon the premises 
and dispute the title of the adverser. In this position, de-
fendant is completely in error. 
The great landmark decision of the United States 
Supreme Court on this matter which has been followed 
since its announcement is Belk v. Meagher, 104 U. S. 
279, 26 Law Ed. 735. The decision was concerned with 
the rights of two locators who had both entered upon 
ground located by other miners prior to either of the con-
testants' entry. The facts were as follows: 
In 1864, A & H located the claim. Their rights on 
the land lapsed on January 1st, 1877. Belk, the plaintiff, 
entered upon and took possession of the claim on Decem-
ber 19, 1876 and continued thereafter in possession at all 
times material. Defendant Meagher entered on the prem-
ises on the 21st day of February, 1877, peaceably and 
without force of any kind. Belk then brought an action 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
to recover the possession of the claim by reason of his 
prior entry and continued possession. 
The Supreme Court of the United States held that 
Belk was not entitled to claim possession as against Meag-
her. Its basic reason .was that at the time Belk entered 
upon the premises the claim of A & H had not lapsed and 
his entry on the ground was, therefore, not a legal entry 
and he could not locate because of the prior location of 
A & H. Belk did not locate again after January I, 1877, 
the date when A & H's claim actually ceased to be valid. 
Meagher, who entered on the 21st of February, 1877, 
entered upon the claim after A & H's claim had become 
invalid and he filed a Notice of Location. He located the 
claim in accordance with Montana law, and was held to 
have had a better right to the claim than Belk even though 
Belk was in possession at the time of Meagher's entry. 
The Supreme Court outlined the lavl applicable in the 
following language at pages 737, 738, L. Ed.; 
P. 737 L. Ed: 
"Locations can only be made where the law 
allows it to be done. Any attempt to go beyond 
that will be of no avail. Hence a relocation on 
lands actually covered at the time by another valid 
and subsisting location is void; and this not only 
against the prior locator, but all the world, be-
cause the law allows no such thing to be done. It 
follows that the relocation of Belk was invalid at 
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the time it was made, and continued to be so until 
January 1, 1877." 
"The next inquiry is, whether the attempted 
location in December became operative on the 1st 
of January, so as to give Belk t,he exclusive right 
to the possession and enjoyment of the claim after 
that. We think it did not. The right to the pos-
session comes only from a valid location. Con-
sequently, if there is no location there can be no 
possession under it. Location does not necessarily 
follow from possession, but possession from loca-
tion. A location is not made by taking posses-
sion alone, but by working on the ground, record-
ing and doing whatever else is required for that 
purpose by the acts of Congress and the local laws 
and regulations." 
P. 738 L. Ed. 
"This brings us to the facts of the present case. 
No one contends that the defendants effected their 
entry and secured their relocation by force. They 
knew what Belk had done and what he was doing. 
He had no right to the possession, and was only on 
the land at intervals. There was no enclosure, 
and he had made no improvement. He apparently 
exercised no other acts of ownership, after J anu-
ary 1, than every explorer of the mineral lands 
of the United States does when he goes on them 
and uses his pick to search for and examine lodes 
and veins. As his attempted relocation was in-
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valid his rights were no more than those of simple 
explorer. ********His possession might have been 
such as would have enabled him to bring an action 
of trespass against one who entered without any 
color or right, but it was not enough, as we think, 
to prevent an entry peaceably and in good faith 
for the purpose of securing a right under the Act 
of Congress to the exclusive possession and en-
joyment of the property. The defendants having 
got into possession and perfected a relocation, have 
secured the better right. When this suit was begun 
they had not only possession, but a right granted 
by the United States to continue their possession 
against all adverse claimants." 
The Statutes, in effect, in the State of Montana at the 
time Belk entered upon the claim to establish his right 
provided that title by adverse possession could be estab-
lished through one-year occupation. 
Belk claimed that since he was in possession of the 
claim and attempting to establish his rights on the ground 
by adverse possession after January 1st, 1877 that the 
defendant, Meagher, should not be permitted to inter-
fere with the perfection of those rights. The situation is 
exactJy similar to the case at Bar. Defendant, on the dis-
puted territory, if its right depends on adverse possession, 
is in the process of establishing that adverse possession 
in 1955; but as in the Belk v. Meagher case the time fixed 
for the establishment of title by adverse possession had 
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not run. Plaintiff peaceably entered, filed his Notice of 
Location, recorded the same and obtained a superior right. 
The United States Supreme Court held that during 
the time that Belk was in possession and before he had 
maintained his possession for a sufficient length of time 
to establish his title, he could be ousted by the entry upon 
the premises by a third person who had complied with the 
law and obtained a superior right to possession. The 
language of the Supreme Court is as follows: 
"Under the provisions of the Revised Statutes 
relied on, Belk could not get a patent for the claim 
he at,tempted to locate unless he secured what is 
here made the equivalent of a valid location by 
actually holding and working for the requisite 
time. If he actually held possession and worked 
the claim long enough and kept all others out, his 
right to a patent would be complete. He had no 
grant of any right of possession. His ultimate 
right to a patent depended entirely on his keep-
ing himself in and all others out, and if he was 
not actually in he was in law out. A peaceable 
adverse entry, coupled with the right to hold pos-
session which was thereby acquired, operated as 
an ouster, which broke the continuity of his hold-
ing and deprived him of the title he might have 
got if he had kept in for the requisite length of 
time. He had made no such location as prevented 
the lands from being, in law, vacant. Others had 
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the right to enter for the purpose of taking them 
up, if it could be done peaceably and without 
force." 
Since the Belk v. Meagher decision there have been 
many cases which have cited and followed it, and as far 
as plaintiff has been able to determine the case is still 
good law and unimpaired by the passage of time. 
A decision following the Belk case which is very 
close on the facts to the present case is Malone v. Jackson, 
137 F. 878, 70 CCA 216. In the Malone case, one Baker 
had entered upon and located a mining claim in Decem-
ber of 1898. His rights expired as of December 31, 1899. 
One Jackson located over the claim on July 10, 1899 and 
continued in possession thereafter working the claim and 
actually mining it. Malone then located the claim on 
January 1, 1902 and it was held by the Federal Court that 
Malone's right to the claim was superior to Jackson. As 
indicated by the relative dates at the time Jackson located 
the claim a valid claim was in existence, and therefore, 
the area was not subject to relocation. 
The Circuit Court of the Ninth Circuit stated the 
holding and the facts in the following language: 
P.882 
"The location of Jackson on July 10, 1899, was 
therefore void and gave him no right of posses-
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sian. But Jackson appears to have been in actual 
possession of the claim in the years 1900, 1901, 
and 1902. He t,estified that he was on the claim 
in 1900; that he had two men on it for two weeks 
- one person besides himself. In the year 190 1 
he ran a 40-foot drain and two little cuts in to the 
side. The value of the work done, he says, was 
$200.00 ** He found deposits of gold on the claim 
in the year 1901. He worked on the claim 
in August of the year 1902. He had a tent on the 
property. This evidence was sufficient to show 
that Baker had abandoned the claim, and that it 
was open to relocation after January 1, 1900. But 
Jackson did not relocate the claim aft,er that date. 
He was merely in possession as an explorer. He 
did not add to his possession the right of exclusive 
possession which he would have obtained by a 
valid relocation. This was done by Malone on 
January 1, 1902 and this relocation by Malone gave 
him the right of exclusive possession until J anu-
ary 1, 1903. Had Jackson relocated the claim on 
January 1, 1900, he would have added to his pos-
session the exclusive right of possession; and had 
he then made the expenditures and improvements 
required by the Statute during the year 1901, the 
claim would not have been open to relocation on 
January 1, 1902 and Malone's relocation on the 
date would have been void." 
The Belk and Malone cases clearly indicate without 
possibility of dispute the law of the United States con-
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cerning the rights of a person who is in possession but 
who has not filed a valid location notice. 
Which of the lines on the Farmer John No.3 are to 
be those marking the boundary between plaintiff and de-
fendant? It is conceded that the boundary of the Farmer 
John No. 3 claim has been moved from time to time, and 
somewhere on the ground the true boundary must be 
established. Will it be the boundary which the defen-
dant now claims? Will it be the boundary which James 
Sargent pointed out to plaintiff and Counsel for defen-
dant in 1952? Or, will it be the lines that James Sargent 
describes in the Notice of Location filed in 1943? It is 
submitted that which of these three lines is to be the line, 
if any is the line, is a factual matter which must be de-
termined from all of the evidence submitted at the time 
of trial and cannot be disposed of by Motion for Summary 
Judgment, as matter of law. 
The most recent case which plaintiff has been able 
to discover deciding the law where adverse possession is 
the basis of the claim is California Dolomite Company 
v. Standridge, 128 C.A. 2d 635, 275 P. 2d 823, Certiorari 
Denied 75 Sup. Ct. 661, 349 U.S. 921, 99 Law Ed. 1254, 
decided in 1954. The facts of the California Dolomite 
case were these. Plaintiff's lessor filed on the claims in 
dispute in 1949. Defendants had already filed on the 
property in 1929 and 1931. After trial the Court resolved 
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the issues of fact in plaintiff's favor and determined that 
defendant's prior filing did not protect their property 
right. The case set forth the basic factual questions which 
will be necessary for the trial court to decide upon a hear-
ing of plaintiff's case. 
P. 825. 
"Appellant's main contention, that the record-
ing of the location notices in 1929, and the filing 
of proofs of labor and notices to hold, are sufficient 
to obviate any necessity for further proof on their 
part because of Section 2332 USRS; and that is es-
tablished by such cases as Lind v. Baker (31 Cal. 
App. 2d, 631, 88p. 2d 777); and Hess v. Moody, 
(35 Cal. App. 2d, 401, 95 P. 2d 699) cannot be sus-
tained. 
"Assuming that such recording and filing would 
be sufficient to make out a prima facie case, this may 
well be overcome by evidence of the factual situa-
tion and what was actually done. Section 2332 U. 
S.R.S. provides that where persons have held and 
worked their claims for the required period, evidence 
of such possession and working shall be sufficient 
to establish a right to a patent. That the elements 
of bolding and working the claims, and the matter 
of continued possession in the manner contemplated 
by the mining laws are questions of fact and depen-
dent upon the evidence received in a particular case, 
is fully recognized in Lind v. Baker, Hess v. Moody, 
and all the other cases to which our attention has 
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been called. Factual questions were here presented 
with respect to whether the legal requirements had 
been met, including the proper posting of notices, 
the erection of monuments on the ground, the do-
ing of work, the nature of the possession taken and 
held, and the use made of the claims in question." 
Whether or not defendant has established any right 
outside the two lines of the Farmer John No. 3 as origin-
ally filed by James Sargent is the basic factual question. 
If it has not, then the disputed area would be the property 
of the plaintiff since he has located on said area a valid 
mining claim and has complied, in every way, with the 
laws governing location. 
From the evidence now presented it would appear 
that the area on which plaintiff filed his Poison Fraction 
was open ground at the time of his filing. He is in the 
same position as Meagher and Malone and his rights are 
established by the prior filing in compliance with State 
Law. His mining claim gives him the superior right to 
possession against all parties, including defendant. All 
that defendant had at the time plaintiff peaceably enter-
ed and made his location was a right to perfect a claim 
by adverse possession. The time for such ciaim to become 
matured and perfected had not passed. 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court erred 
in deciding as matter of law the rights of the parties; that 
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plaintiff is entitled to have his claim litigated and the 
Court should return this action to the trial court for trial 
and for the presentation of evidence by both parties con-
cerning their respective rights. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court erred 
in granting the Motion for Summary Judgment; that this 
Court should reverse the judgment and remand the case 
to the lower court for proceedings in the normal way for 
the determination of disputed fact issues so that plain-
tiff will have his day in Court and can present his evi-
dence. 
Respectfully submitted 
ROBERT W. HUGHES 
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